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The Fine-Tuning Argument:
Exploring the Improbability
of Our Existence
Klaas Landsman
A mild form of satire may be the appropriate antidote. Imagine,
if you will, the wonderment of a species of mud worms who
discover that if the constant of thermometric conductivity of
mud were different by a small percentage they would not be
able to survive. (Earman 1987, p. 314).
Abstract Our laws of nature and our cosmos appear to be delicately ﬁne-tuned for
life to emerge, in a way that seems hard to attribute to chance. In view of this, some
have taken the opportunity to revive the scholastic Argument from Design, whereas
others have felt the need to explain this apparent ﬁne-tuning of the clockwork of the
Universe by proposing the existence of a ‘Multiverse’. We analyze this issue from a
sober perspective. Having reviewed the literature and having added several
observations of our own, we conclude that cosmic ﬁne-tuning supports neither
Design nor a Multiverse, since both of these fail at an explanatory level as well as in
the more quantitative context of Bayesian conﬁrmation theory (although there
might be other reasons to believe in these ideas, to be found in religion and in
inflation and/or string theory, respectively). In fact, ﬁne-tuning and Design even
seem to be at odds with each other, whereas the inference from ﬁne-tuning to a
Multiverse only works if the latter is underwritten by an additional metaphysical
hypothesis we consider unwarranted. Instead, we suggest that ﬁne-tuning requires
no special explanation at all, since it is not the Universe that is ﬁne-tuned for life,
but life that has been ﬁne-tuned to the Universe.
1 Introduction
Twentieth Century physics and cosmology have revealed an astonishing path
towards our existence, which appears to be predicated on a delicate interplay
between the three fundamental forces that govern the behavior of matter at very
small distances and the long-range force of gravity. The former control chemistry
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and hence life as we know it, whereas the latter is responsible for the overall
evolution and structure of the Universe.
• If the state of the hot dense matter immediately after the Big Bang had been ever
so slightly different, then the Universe would either have rapidly recollapsed, or
would have expanded far too quickly into a chilling, eternal void. Either way,
there would have been no ‘structure’ in the Universe in the form of stars and
galaxies.
• Even given the above ﬁne-tuning, if any one of the three short-range forces had
been just a tiny bit different in strength, or if the masses of some elementary
particles had been a little unlike they are, there would have been no recognizable
chemistry in either the inorganic or the organic domain. Thus there would have
been no Earth, no carbon, et cetera, let alone the human brains to study those.
Broadly, ﬁve different responses to the impression of ﬁne-tuning have been
given:
1. Design: updating the scholastic Fifth Way of Aquinas (1485/1286), the Universe
has been ﬁne-tuned with the emergence of (human) life among its designated
purposes.1
2. Multiverse: the idea that our Universe is just one among innumerably many,
each of which is controlled by different parameters in the (otherwise ﬁxed) laws
of nature. This seemingly outrageous idea is actually endorsed by some of the
most eminent scientists in the world, such as Martin Rees (1999) and Steven
Weinberg (2007). The underlying idea was nicely explained by Rees in a talk in
2003, raising the analogy with ‘an ‘off the shelf’ clothes shop: “if the shop has a
1“The Fifth Way is based on the directedness of things. We observe that some things which lack
awareness, namely natural bodies, act for the sake of an end. This is clear because they always or
commonly act in the same manner to achieve what is best, which shows that they reach their goal
not by chance but because they tend towards it. Now things which lack awareness do not tend
towards a goal unless directed by something with awareness and intelligence, like an arrow by an
archer. Therefore there is some intelligent being by whom everything in nature is directed to a
goal, and this we call ‘God’.” Translation in Kenny (1969, p. 96), to whom we also refer for a
critical review of Aquinas’s proofs of the existence of God. It is a moot point whether the Fifth
Way is really an example of the medieval Argument of Design, which Aquinas expresses else-
where as: “The arrangement of diverse things cannot be dictated by their own private and
divergent natures; of themselves they are diverse and exhibit no tendency to form a pattern. It
follows that the order of many among themselves is either a matter of chance or must be attributed
to one ﬁrst planner who has a purpose in mind.” (Kenny 1969, p. 116). Everitt (2004) distinguishes
between the Argument to Design and the Argument from Order, respectively, both of which may
still be found in modern Christian apologists such as Swinburne (2004), Küng (2005), and Collins
(2009), rebutted by e.g., Everitt (2004) and Philipse (2012). It is clear from his writings (such as
the General Scholium in Principia) that Isaac Newton supported the Argument from Design,
followed by Bentley (1692). Throughout early modern science, the gradual ‘reading’ of the ‘Book
of Nature’, seen as a second ‘book’ God had left mankind next to the Bible, was implicitly or
explicitly seen as a conﬁrmation of Design (Jorink 2010). Paley (1802) introduced the famous
watchmaker analogy obliterated by Dawkins (1986). See also Barrow and Tipler (1986) and
Manson (2003) for overviews of the Argument from Design.
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large stock, we’re not surprised to ﬁnd one suit that ﬁts. Likewise, if our uni-
verse is selected from a multiverse, its seemingly designed or ﬁne-tuned features
wouldn’t be surprising.” (Mellor 2002).
3. Blind Chance: constants of Nature and initial conditions have arbitrary values,
and it is just a matter of coincidence that their actual values turn out to enable
life.2
4. Blind Necessity: the Universe could not have been made in a different way or
order, yet producing life is not among its goals since it fails to have any
(Spinoza 1677).3
5. Misguided: the ﬁne-tuning problem should be resolved by some appropriate
therapy.
We will argue that whatever reasons one may have for supporting the ﬁrst or the
second option, ﬁne-tuning should not be among them. Contemporary physics
makes it hard to choose between the third and the fourth option (both of which seem
to have supporters among physicists and philosophers),4 but in any case our own
sympathy lies with the ﬁfth.
First, however, we have to delineate the issue. The Fine-Tuning Argument, to be
abbreviated by FTA in what follows, claims that the present Universe (including the
laws that govern it and the initial conditions from which it has evolved) permits life
only because these laws and conditions take a very special form, small changes in
which would make life impossible. This claim is actually quite ambiguous, in
(at least) two directions.
1. The FTA being counterfactual (or, in Humanities jargon, being ‘what if’ or
‘alternate’ history), it should be made clear what exactly is variable. Here the
range lies between raw Existence itself at one end (Rundle 2004; Holt 2012;
Leslie and Kuhn 2013) and ﬁxed laws of nature and a Big Bang with merely a
few variable parameters at the other (cf. Rees 1999; Hogan 2000; Aguirre 2001;
Tegmark et al. 2006).
Unless one is satisﬁed with pure philosophical speculation, speciﬁc technical
results are only available at the latter end, to which we shall therefore restrict the
argument.
2. It should be made clear what kind of ‘life’ the Universe is (allegedly) ﬁne-tuned
for, and also, to what extent the emergence of whatever kind of life is deemed
merely possible (if only in principle, perhaps with very low probability), or
2In the area of biology, a classical book expressing this position is Monod (1971).
3The most prominent modern Spinozist was Albert Einstein: “there are no arbitrary constants of
this kind; that is to say, nature is so constituted that it is possible logically to lay down such
strongly determined laws that within these laws only rationally completely determined constants
occur (not constants, therefore, whose numerical value could be changed without destroying the
theory.” (Einstein in Schilpp 1949, p. 63).
4The famous ending of The First Three Minutes by the physicist Weinberg (1977)—“The more the
universe appears comprehensible, the more it also appears pointless.”—could be bracketed under
either.
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likely, or absolutely certain. For example, should we ﬁne-tune just for the
possible existence of self-replicating structures like RNA and DNA,5 or for “a
planet where enough wheat or rice could be cultivated to feed several billion
people” (Ward and Brownlee 2000, p. 20), or for one where morally (or indeed
immorally) acting rational agents emerge (Swinburne 2004), perhaps even
minds the like of Newton and Beethoven?
It seems uncontroversial that at the lowest end, the Universe should exhibit
some kind of order and structure in order to at least enable life, whereas towards
the upper end it has (perhaps unsurprisingly) been claimed that essentially a
copy of our Sun and our Earth (with even the nearby presence of a big planet
like Jupiter to keep out asteroids) is required, including oceans, plate tectonics
and other seismic activity, and a magnetic ﬁeld helping to stabilize the atmo-
sphere (Ward and Brownlee 2000).6
For most of the discussion we go for circumstances favoring simple
carbon-based life; the transition to complex forms of life will only play a role in
discussing the ﬁne-tuning of our solar system (which is crucial to some and just
a detail to others).7
According to modern cosmology based on the (hot) Big Bang scenario,8 this
means that the Universe must be sufﬁciently old and structured so that at least
galaxies and several generations of stars have formed; this already takes billions of
years.9 The subsequent move to viable planets and life then takes roughly a similar
amount of time, so that within say half an order of magnitude the current age of the
5See e.g. Smith and Szathmáry (1995) and Ward and Brownlee (2000) for theories of the origin of
life.
6The conservatism—perhaps even lack of imagination—of such scenarios is striking. But
science-ﬁction movies such as Star Trek, Star Wars, E.T., My Stepmother is an Alien (not to speak
of Emmanuelle, Queen of the Galaxy) hardly do better. Conway’s Game of Life suggests that initial
complexity is not at all needed to generate complex structures, which may well include intelligent
life in as yet unknown guise.
7Reprimanding the late Carl Sagan, who expected intelligent life to exist in millions of places even
within our own Galaxy, Ward and Brownlee (2000) claim that whereas this might indeed apply to
the most basic forms of life, it is the move to complex (let alone intelligent) life that is extremely
rare (because of the multitude of special conditions required), perhaps having been accomplished
only on Earth.
8See e.g. Rees (1999), Ellis (2007), and Weinberg (2008), at increasing level of technicality.
9The reason (which may be baffling on ﬁrst reading) is that in addition to the light elements formed
in Big Bang nucleosynthesis (i.e., about 75 % hydrogen and 25 % helium, with traces of other
elements up to Lithium, see Galli and Palla 2013), the heavier elements in the Periodic
Table (many of which are necessary for biochemistry and/or the composition of the Earth and its
atmosphere) were formed in stars, to be subsequently blown into the cosmos by e.g. supernova
explosions. In that way, some of these elements eventually ended up in our solar system, where
they are indispensable in constituting both the Earth and ourselves. See Arnett (1996) for a
technical account and Ward and Brownlee (2000) for a popular one.
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Universe seems necessary to support life. In view of the expansion of the Universe,
a similar comment could be made about its size, exaggerated as it might seem for
the purpose of explaining life on earth.
2 Evidence for Fine-Tuning
Thanks to impressive progress in both cosmology and (sub) nuclear physics, over
the second half of the 20th Century it began to be realized that the above scenario is
predicated on seemingly exquisite ﬁne-tuning of some of the constants of Nature
and initial conditions of the Universe. We just give some of the best known and best
understood cases here.10
One of the ﬁrst examples was the ‘Beryllium bottleneck’ studied by Hoyle in
1951, which is concerned with the mechanism through which stars produce carbon
and oxygen.11 This was not only a major correct scientiﬁc prediction based on
‘anthropic reasoning’ in the sense that some previously unknown physical effect
(viz. the energy level in question) had to exist in order to explain some crucial
condition for life; it involves dramatic ﬁne-tuning, too, in that the nucleon-nucleon
force must lie near its actual strength within about one part in a thousand in order to
obtain the observed abundances of carbon and oxygen, which happen to be the right
amounts needed for life (Ekström et al. 2010).
Another well-understood example from nuclear physics is the mass difference
between protons and neutrons, or, more precisely, between the down quark and the
up quark (Hogan 2000).12 This mass difference is positive (making the neutron
heavier than the proton); if it weren’t, the proton would fall apart and there would
be no chemistry as we know it. On the other hand, the difference can’t be too large,
10See Barrow and Tipler (1986), Leslie (1989), Davies (2006), Ellis (2007), and Barnes (2012) for
further examples and more detailed references. Stenger (2011) and Bradford (2011, 2013) attempt
to play down the accuracies claimed of ﬁne-tuning, whilst Aguirre (2001) casts doubt on its limited
scope.
11In order to make carbon, two 4He nuclei must collide to form 8Be, upon which a third 4He
nucleus must join so as to give 12C (from which, in turn, 16O is made by adding another 4He
nucleus). This second step must happen extremely quickly, since the 8Be isotope formed in the ﬁrst
step is highly unstable. Without the exquisitely ﬁne-tuned energy level in 12C (lying at the 8Be
+4He reaction energy) predicted by Hoyle, this formation process would be far too infrequent to
explain the known cosmic abundances. Opponents of anthropic reasoning would be right in
pointing out that these abundances as such (rather than their implications for the possibility of
human life) formed the proper basis for Hoyle’s prediction.
12Quarks are subnuclear particles that come in six varieties, of which only the so-called ‘up’ and
‘down’ quarks are relevant to ordinary matter. A neutron consists of one up quark and two down
quarks, whereas a proton consists of two up quarks and one down quark. The electric charges (in
units where an electron has charge −1) are 2/3 for the up quark and −1/3 for the down quark,
making a neutron electrically neutral (as its name suggests) whilst giving a proton charge +1.
Atoms consist of nuclei (which in turn consist of protons and neutrons) surrounded by electrons,
whose total charge exactly cancels that of the nucleus.
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for otherwise stars (or hydrogen bombs, for that matter) could not be fueled by
nuclear fusion and stars like our Sun would not exist.13 Both require a ﬁne-tuning of
the mass difference by about 10 %.
Moving from fundamental forces to initial conditions, the solar system seems
ﬁne-tuned for life in various ways, most notably in the distance between the Sun
and the Earth: if this had been greater (or smaller) by at most a few precent it would
have been too cold (or too hot) for at least complex life to develop. Furthermore, to
that effect the solar system must remain stable for billions of years, and after the ﬁrst
billion years or so the Earth should not be hit by comets or asteroids too often. Both
conditions are sensitive to the precise number and conﬁguration of the planets
(Ward and Brownlee 2000).
Turning from the solar system to initial conditions of our Universe, but still
staying safely within the realm of well-understood physics and cosmology, Rees
(1999) and others have drawn attention to the ﬁne-tuning of another cosmological
number called Q, which gives the size of inhomogeneities, or ‘ripples’, in the early
Universe and is of the order Q * 0.00001, or one part in a hundred thousand.14
This parameter is ﬁne-tuned by a factor of about ten on both sides (Rees 1999;
Tegmark et al. 2006): if it had been less than a tenth of its current value, then no
galaxies would have been formed (and hence no stars and planets). If, on the other
hand, it had been more than ten times its actual value, then matter would have been
too lumpy, so that there wouldn’t be any stars (and planets) either, but only black
holes. Either way, a key condition for life would be violated.15
The expansion of the Universe is controlled by a number called Ω, deﬁned as the
ratio between the actual matter density in the Universe and the so-called critical
density. If Ω ≤ 1, then the Universe would expand forever, whereas Ω > 1 would
portend a recollapse. Thus Ω = 1 is a critical point.16 It is remarkable enough that
13Technically, the fundamental ‘pp–reaction’ (i.e., proton + proton→Deuteron + positron + neutrino),
which lies at the beginning of nuclear fusion, would go in the wrong direction.
14The Universe is approximately 13.7 billion years old (which is about three times as old as the
Earth). Almost 400.000 years after the Big Bang, the Universe (which had been something like a
hot soup of elementary particles until then) became transparent to electromagnetic radiation (which
in everyday life includes light as well as radio waves, but whose spectrum is much larger) and
subsequently became almost completely dark, as it is now. The so-called cosmic microwave
background (CMB, discovered in 1964 by Penzias and Wilson), which still pervades the Universe
at a current temperature of about 3 K (=−270 °C), is a relic from that era. It is almost completely
homogeneous and isotropic, except for the ripples in question, whose (relative) size is given by the
parameter Q. This provides direct information about the inhomogeneities of the Universe at the
time the CMB was formed, i.e., when it was 400.000 years old.
15As analyzed by the Planck Collaboration (2014), variations in the constants of Nature would also
affect the value of Q, which is ultimately determined by the physics of the early Universe. Hence
its known value of 10−5 constrains such variations; in particular, the ﬁne-tuning of Q necessary for
life in turn ﬁne-tunes the ﬁne-structure constant α (which controls electromagnetism and light) to
within 1 % of its value (1/137).
16Roughly, the physics behind this is that at small matter density the (literally ‘energetic’)
expansion drive inherited from the Big Bang beats the gravitational force, which tries to pull
matter together.
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currently Ω ≈ 1 (within a few percent); what is astonishing is that this is the case at
such a high age of the Universe. Namely, for Ω to retain its (almost) critical value
for billions of years, it must have had this value right from the very beginning to a
precision of at least 55 decimal places.17
This leads us straight to Einstein’s cosmological constant Λ, which he intro-
duced into his theory of gravity in 1917 in order to (at least theoretically) stabilize
the Universe against contracting or expanding, to subsequently delete it in 1929
after Hubble’s landmark observation of the expansion of the Universe (famously
calling its introduction his “biggest blunder”). Ironically, Λ made a come-back in
1998 as the leading theoretical explanation of the (empirical) discovery that the
expansion of the Universe is currently accelerating.18 For us, the point is that even
the currently accepted value of Λ remains very close to zero, whereas according to
(quantum ﬁeld) theory it should be about 55 (some even say 120) orders of mag-
nitude larger (Martin 2012). This is often seen as a ﬁne-tuning problem, because
some compensating mechanism must be at work to cancel its very large natural
value with a precision of (once again) 55 decimal places.19
The ﬁne-tuning of all numbers considered so far seems to be dwarfed by a
knock-down FTA given by Roger Penrose (1979, 2004), who claims that in order to
produce a Universe that even very roughly looks like ours, its initial conditions
(among some generic set) must have been ﬁne-tuned with a precision of one to
1010
123
, arguably the largest number ever conceived: all atoms in the Universe
would not sufﬁce to write it out in full.20 Penrose’s argument is an extreme version
of an idea originally due to Boltzmann, who near the end of the 19th Century
argued that the direction of time is a consequence of the increase of entropy in the
17If not, the expansion would either have been too fast for structures like galaxies to emerge, or too
slow to prevent rapid recollapse due to gravity, leading to a Big Crunch (Rees 1999). This
ﬁne-tuning problem is often called the flatness problem, since the Universe is exactly flat (in the
sense of Einstein’s Theory of General Relativity) when Ω = 1 (otherwise it either has a spherical or
a hyperbolic geometry). The ﬁne-tuning problem for Ω is generally considered to be solved by the
(still speculative) theory of cosmic inflation (Liddle and Lyth 2000; Weinberg 2008), but even if
this theory is correct, it merely shifts the ﬁne-tuning from one place to another, since the
parameters in any theory of inflation have to be ﬁne-tuned at least as much as Ω; Carroll and Tam
(2010) claim this would even be necessary to ten million decimals. In addition, the flatness
problem may not be a problem at all, like the horizon problem (McCoy 2015).
18The Physics Nobel Prize in 2011 was awarded to Perlmutter, Schmidt, and Riess for this
discovery. The cosmological constant Λ can theoretically account for this acceleration as some sort
of an invisible driving energy. Thus reinterpreted as ‘dark energy’, Λ contributes as much as 70 %
to the energy density of the Universe and hence it is currently also the leading contributor to Ω
(Planck Collaboration 2015).
19The broader context of this is what is called the naturalness problem in quantum ﬁeld theory,
ﬁrst raised by the Dutch Nobel Laureate Gerard ’t Hooft in 1980. His claim was that a theory is
unnatural if some parameter that is expected to be large is actually (almost) zero, unless there is a
symmetry enforcing the latter. This generates its own ﬁne-tuning problems, which we do not
discuss here; see Grinbaum (2012).
20The number called “googol” that the internet company Google has (erroneously) been named
after is ‘merely’ 10100; Penrose’s number is even much larger than a one with googol many zeroes.
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future but not in the past,21 which requires an extremely unlikely initial state (Price
1997; Ufﬁnk 2007; Lebowitz 2008). However, this kind of reasoning is as brilliant
as it is controversial (Callendar 2004, 2010; Earman 2006; Eckhardt 2006; Wallace
2010; Schiffrin and Wald 2012). More generally, the more extreme the asserted
ﬁne-tuning is, the more adventurous the underlying arguments are (or so we think).
To be on the safe side, the ﬁne-tuning of Ω, Λ, and Penrose’s initial condition
should perhaps be ignored, leaving us with the other examples, and a few similar
ones not discussed here. But these should certainly sufﬁce to make a case for
ﬁne-tuning that is serious enough to urge the reader to at least make a bet on one the
ﬁve options listed above.
3 General Arguments
Before turning to a speciﬁc discussion of the Design and the Multiverse proposals,
we make a few critical (yet impartial) remarks that put the FTA in perspective (see
also Sober 2004; Manson 2009). Adherents of the FTA typically use analogies like
the following:
• Someone lays out a deck of 52 cards after it has been shuffled. If the cards
emerge in some canonical order (e.g., the Ace of Spades down to 2, then the Ace
of Hearts down to 2, etc.), then, on the tacit assumption that each outcome is
equally (un)likely, this very particular outcome supposedly cannot have been
due to ‘luck’ or chance.
• Alternatively, if a die is tossed a large number of times and the number 6 comes
up every time, one would expect the die to be loaded, or the person who cast it to
be a very skillful con man. Once again, each outcome was assumed equally likely.
First, there is an underlying assumption in the FTA to the effect that the ‘con-
stants’ of Nature as well as the initial conditions of the Universe (to both of which
the emergence of life is allegedly exquisitely sensitive) are similarly variable. This
may or may not be the case; the present state of science is not advanced enough to
decide between chance and necessity concerning the laws of nature and the
beginning of the Universe.22
21This is a technical way of saying that heat flows from hot bodies to cold ones, that milk combines
with tea to form a homogeneous mixture, that the cup containing it will fall apart if it falls on the
ground, etc.; in all cases the opposite processes are physically possible, but are so unlikely that
they never occur.
22Our own hunch tends towards necessity, for reasons lying in constructive quantum ﬁeld theory
(Glimm and Jaffe 1987): it turns out to be extremely difﬁcult to give a mathematically rigorous
construction of elementary particle physics, and the value of the constants may be ﬁxed by the
requirement of mathematical existence and consistency of the theory. For example, the so-called
scalar u4 theory is believed to be trivial in four (space-time) dimensions, which implies that the
relevant ‘constant of Nature’ must be zero (Fernandez et al. 1992). This is as ﬁne a ﬁne-tuning as
anything! Similarly, in cosmology the Big Bang (and hence the initial conditions for the
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Second, granted that the ‘constants’ etc. are variable in principle (in the sense
that values other than the current ones preserve the existence and consistency of the
theories in which they occur), it is quite unclear to what extent they can vary and
which variations may be regarded as ‘small’; yet the FTA relies on the assumption
that even ‘small’ variations would block the emergence of life (Manson 2000). In
the absence of such information, it would be natural to assume that any (real,
positive as appropriate) value may be assumed, but in that case mathematical
probabilistic reasoning (which is necessary for the FTA in order to say that the
current values are ‘unlikely’) turns out to be impossible (McGrew et al. 2001;
Colyvan et al. 2005; Koperski 2005).23 But also if a large but ﬁnite number of
values (per constant or initial condition) needs be taken into account, it is hard to
assign any kind of probability to any of the alternative values; even the assumption
that each values is equally likely seems totally arbitrary (Everitt 2004; Norton
2010).
Nonetheless, these problems may perhaps be overcome and in any case, for the
sake of argument we will continue to use the metaphors opening this section.
4 Critiquing the Inference of Design from Fine-Tuning
The idea that cosmic ﬁne-tuning originates in design by something like an intel-
ligent Creator ﬁts into a long-standing Judeo-Christian tradition, where both the
Cosmos and biology were explained in that way.24 Now that biology has yielded to
the theory of Evolution proposed by Darwin and Wallace in the mid 19th
Century,25 the battleground has apparently moved back to the cosmos. Also there,
(Footnote 22 continued)
Universe it gives rise to) actually seems to be an illusion caused by the epistemic fact that we look
at the quantum world through classical glasses. In this case, the requirement that cosmology as we
know it must actually emerge in the classical limit of some quantum theory (or of some future
theory replacing quantum mechanics) may well ﬁx the initial conditions.
23Suppose some constant takes values in the real axis. In the absence of good reasons to the
contrary, any alternative value to the current one should have the same probability. But there is no
flat probability measure on the real numbers (or on any non-compact subset thereof). Even if there
were such a measure, any ﬁnite interval, however large or small, would have measure zero, so that
one could not even (mathematically) express the difference between some constant permitting life
if it just lies within some extremely small bandwidth (as the FTA has it), or in some enormously
large one (which would refute the FTA).
24See footnote 1 and refs. therein. Note that a ﬁne-tuning intelligent Creator is still a long shot from
the Christian God whom Swinburne (2004), Küng (2005), and Collins (2009) are really after!
25The Dutch primatologist De Waal (2013) recently noted how reasonable Creationism originally
was: animals known to the population of the Middle East (where Judeo-Christian thought origi-
nated) included camels etc. but no primates, and hence all living creatures appeared very different
from mankind.
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Design remains a vulnerable idea.26 For the sake of argument we do not question
the coherence of the idea of an intelligent Creator as such, although such a spirit
seems chimerical (Everitt 2004; Philipse 2012).
First, in slightly different ways Smith (1993) and Barnes (2012) both made the
point that the FTA does not claim, or support the conclusion, that the present
Universe is optimal for intelligent life. Indeed, it hardly seems to be: even granted
all the ﬁne-tuning in the world as well as the existence of our earth with its
relatively favorable conditions (Ward and Brownlee 2000), evolution has been
walking a tightrope so as to produce as much as jellyﬁsh, not to speak of primates
(Dawkins 1996). This fact alone casts doubt on the FTA as an Argument of Design,
for surely a benign Creator would prefer a Universe optimal for life, rather than one
that narrowly permits it? From a theistic perspective it would seem far more efﬁ-
cient to have a cosmic architecture that is robust for its designated goal.
Second, the inference to Design from the FTA seems to rest on a decisive tacit
assumption whose exposure sustantially weakens this inference (Bradley 2001).
The cards analogy presupposes that there was such a thing as a canonical order; if
there weren’t, then any particular outcome would be thought of in the same way and
would of course be attributed to chance. Similarly, the dice metaphor presupposes
that it is special for 6 to come up every single time; probabilistically speaking, every
other outcome would have been just as (un)likely as the given sequence of sixes.27
An then again, in the case of independently tunable constants of Nature and/or
initial conditions, one (perhaps approximate) value of each of these must ﬁrst be
marked with a special label like ‘life-permitting’ in order for the analogy with cards
or dice (and hence the appeal of the FTA) to work. The FTA is predicated on such
marking, which already presupposes that life is special.
26In this context, it is worth mentioning that the familiar endorsement of the Big Bang by modern
Christian apologists (see footnote 1) as a scientiﬁc conﬁrmation of the creation story in Genesis 1
seems wishful thinking based on a common mistranslation of its opening line as “In the beginning
God created the heavens and the earth” (and similarly in other languages), whereas the original
Hebrew text does not intend the “beginning” as an absolute beginning of time but rather as the
starting point of the action expressed by the following verb, whilst “created” should have read
“separated” (Van Wolde 2009). More generally, the world picture at the time of writing of Genesis
was that of a disk surrounded by water, the ensuing creation story not being one of creatio ex
nihilo, but one in which God grounds the Earth by setting it on pillars. This led to a tripartite
picture of the Cosmos as consisting of water, earth, and heaven. See also Van Wolde’s contri-
bution to this volume, as well as Noordmans (1934). The remarkable creatio ex nihilo story
introduced by the Church Fathers therefore lacks textual support from the Bible.
27Entropy arguments do not improve the case for Design. It is true that although the probability of
a sequence of all sixes is the same as the probability of any other outcome, the former becomes
special if we coarse-grain the outcome space by counting the number of sixes in a given long
sequence of throws and record that information only. The outcome with sixes only then becomes
extremely unlikely, since it could only have occurred in one possible way, whereas outcomes with
fewer sixes have multiple realizations (the maximum probability occurring when the number of
sixes is about one-sixth of the total number of throws). The point is that the very act of
coarse-graining again presupposes that six is a special value.
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It is irrelevant to this objection whether or not life is indeed special; the point is
that the assumption that life be special has to be made in addition to the FTA in
order to launch the latter on track to Design. But the inference from the (assumed)
speciality of life to Design hardly needs the FTA: even if all values of the constants
and initial conditions would lead to a life-permitting Universe, those who think that
life is special would presumably point to a Creator. In fact, both by the arguments
recalled at the beginning of this section and those below, their case would actually
be considerably stronger than the FTA.
In sum, ﬁne-tuning is not by itself sufﬁcient as a source for an Argument of
Design; it is the combination with an assumption to the effect that life is somehow
singled out, preferred, or special. But that assumption is the one that carries the
inference to Design; the moment one makes it, ﬁne-tuning seems counter-
productive rather than helpful.
Attempts to give the Design Argument a quantitative turn (Swinburne 2004;
Collins 2009) make things even worse (Bradley 2002; Halvorson 2014). Such
attempt are typically based on Bayesian Conﬁrmation Theory. This is a mathe-
matical technique for the analysis and computation of the probability P (H|E) that a
given hypothesis H is true in the light of certain evidence E (which may speak for or
against H, or may be neutral). Almost every argument in Bayesian Conﬁrmation
Theory is ultimately based on Bayes’ Theorem
PðHjEÞ ¼ PðEjHÞ  PðHÞ=PðEÞ;
where P(H|E) is the probability that E is true given the truth of the hypothesis H,
whilst P(H) and P(E) are the probabilities that H and E are true without knowing
E and H, respectively (but typically assuming certain background knowledge common
to bothH and E, which is very important but has been suppressed from the notation).28
In the case at hand, theists want to argue that the Universe being ﬁne-tuned for
Life makes Design more likely, i.e., that P(D|L) > P (D), or, equivalently, that
P(L|D) > P(L) (that is, Design favors life). The problem is that theists do not merely
ask for the latter inequality; what they really believe is that P(L|D) ≈ 1, for the
existence of God should make the emergence of life almost certain.29 For simplicity,
28This implies, in particular, that P(H|E) > P(H), i.e., E conﬁrms H, if and only if P(E|H) > P(E),
which is often computable. The probabilities in question are usually (though not necessarily) taken
to be epistemic or (inter)subjective, so that the whole discussion is concerned with probabilities
construed as numerical measures of degrees of belief. For technical as well as philosophical
background on Bayesianism see e.g. Howson and Urbach (2006), Sober (2008), and Handﬁeld
(2012).
29Swinburne (2004), though, occasionally assumes that P(L|D) = 1/2 as a subjective probability
(based on our ignorance of God’s intentions), which still makes his reasoning vulnerable to the
argument below. In Swinburne (2004), arguments implying PðLjDÞ[PðLÞ are called C-induc-
tive, whereas the stronger ones implying PðLjDÞ[ 1=2 are said to be P-inductive. Swinburne’s
strategy is to combine a large number of C-inductive arguments into a single overarching
P-inductive one, but according to Philipse (2012) every single one of Swinburne’s C-inductive
arguments is actually invalid (and we agree with Philipse).
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ﬁrst assume that P(L|D) = 1. Bayes’ Theorem then gives P(D|L) = P(D)/P(L),
whence P(D) ≤ P (L). More generally, assume P(L|D) ≥ 1/2, or, equivalently,
PðLjDÞPð:LjDÞ, where ¬L is the proposition that life does not exist. If (D,L) is the
conjunction of D and L, we then have
PðDÞ ¼ PðD; LÞþPðD;:LÞ 2PðD; LÞ 2PðLÞ;
since PðD;:LÞPðD; LÞ by assumption. Thus a negligible prior probability of life
(on which assumption the FTA is based!) implies a hardly less negligible prior
probability of Design. This inequality make the Argument from Design
self-defeating as an explanation of ﬁne-tuning, but in any case, both the interpre-
tation and the numerical value of P(D) are so obscure and ill-deﬁned that the whole
discussion seems, well, scholastic.
5 Critiquing the Inference of a Multiverse
from Fine-Tuning
The idea of Design may be said to be human-oriented in a spiritual way, whereas
the idea of a Multiverse more technically hinges on the existence of observers, as
expressed by the so-called (weak) Anthropic Principle (Barrow and Tipler 1986;
Bostrom 2002). The claim is that there are innumerable Universes (jointly forming
a ‘Multiverse’), each having its own ‘constants’ of Nature and initial conditions, so
that, unlikely as the life-inducing values of these constants and conditions in our
Universe may be, they simply must occur within this unfathomable plurality. The
point, then, is that we have to observe precisely those values because in other
Universes there simply are no observers. This principle has been labeled both
‘tautological’ and ‘unscientiﬁc’. Some love it and some hate it, but we do not need
to take sides in this debate: all we wish to do is ﬁnd out whether or not the FTA
speaks in favour of a Multiverse, looking at both an explanatory and a probabilistic
level. Thus the question is whether the (alleged) fact of ﬁne-tuning is (at least to
some extent) explained by a Multiverse, or if, in the context of Bayesian conﬁr-
mation theory, the evidence of ﬁne-tuning increases the probability of the
hypothesis that a Multiverse exists.30 To get the technical discussion going, the
following metaphors have been used:
30Although ﬁne-tuning has been claimed (notably by Rees 1999) to provide independent moti-
vation for believing in a Multiverse, the existence of a Multiverse may be a technical consequence
of some combination of string theory (Susskind 2005; Schellekens 2013) and cosmological
inflation (Liddle and Lyth 2000; Weinberg 2008). Both theories are highly speculative, though (the
latter less so than the former), and concerning the ‘landscape’ idea it is hard to avoid the
impression that string theorists turn vice into virtue by selling the inability of string theory to
predict anything as an ability to predict everything (a similar worry may also apply to inflation, cf.
Smeenk 2014). Let us also note that even if it were to make any sense, the ‘emergent multiverse’
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• Rees’s ‘off the shelf’ clothes shop has already been mentioned in the
Introduction: if someone enters a shop that sells suits in one size only (i.e., a
single Universe), it would be amazing if it ﬁtted (i.e., enabled life). However, if
all sizes are sold (in a Multiverse, that is), the client would not at all be surprised
to ﬁnd a suit that ﬁts.
• Leslie’s (1989) ﬁring squad analogy states that someone should be executed by
a ﬁring squad, consisting of many marksmen, but they all miss. This amounts to
ﬁne-tuning for life in a single Universe. The thrust of the metaphor arises when
the lucky executee is the sole survivor among a large number of other convicts,
most or all of whom are killed (analogously to the other branches of the
Multiverse, most or all of which are inhospitable to life). The idea is that
although each convict had a small a priori probability of not being hit, if there
are many of them these small individual probabilities of survival add up to a
large probability that someone survives.
• Bradley (2009, 2012) considers an urn that is ﬁlled according to a random
procedure:
– If a coin flip gives Heads (corresponds to a single Universe), either a small
ball (life) or a large one (no life) is entered (depending on a further coin flip).
– In case of Tails (modeling a ‘Binaverse’ for simplicity), two balls enter the
urn, whose sizes depend on two further coin flips (leaving four possibilities).
Using a biased drawing procedure that could only yield either a small ball or
nothing, a small ball is obtained (playing the role of a life-enabling Universe).
A simple Bayesian computation shows that this outcome conﬁrms Tails for the
initial flip.
Each of these stories is insightful and worth contemplating. For example, the
ﬁrst one nicely contrasts the Multiverse with Design, which would correspond to
bespoke tailoring and hence, at least from a secular point of view, commits the
fallacy of putting the customer (i.e., life) ﬁrst, instead of the tailor (i.e., the Universe
as it is). The Dostoyevskian character of the second highlights the Anthropic
Principle, whose associated selection effects (Bostrom 2002) are also quantitatively
taken into account by the third.
Nonetheless, on closer inspection each is sufﬁciently vulnerable to fail to clinch
the issue in favour of the Multiverse. One point is that although each author is well
aware of (and the second and the third even respond to) the Inverse Gambler’s
Fallacy (Hacking 1987),31 this fallacy is not really avoided (White 2000). In its
simplest version, this is the mistake made by a gambler who enters a casino or a
pub, notices that a double six is thrown at some table, and asks if this is the ﬁrst roll
(Footnote 30 continued)
claimed to exist in the so-called Many-Worlds (or Everett) Interpretation of quantum mechanics
(Wallace 2012) is a red herring in the present context, for, as far as we understand, all its branches
have exactly the same laws of nature, including the values of the constants.
31The Gambler’s Fallacy is the mistake that after observing say 35 throws of two fair dice without
a double six, this preferred outcome has become more likely (than 1/36) in the next throw.
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of the evening (his underlying false assumption being that this particular outcome is
more likely if many rolls preceded it). Despite claims to the contrary (Leslie 1988;
Manson and Thrush 2003; Bradley 2009, 2012), Hacking’s analysis that this is
precisely the error made by those who favor a Multiverse based on the FTA in our
opinion still stands. For example, in Rees’ analogy of the clothes shop, what needs
to be explained is not that some suit in the shop turns out to ﬁt the customer, but that
the one he happens to be standing in front of does. Similarly, the probability that a
given executee survives is independent of whoever else is going to be shot in the
same round. And ﬁnally, the relevant urn metaphor is not the one described above,
but the one in which Tails leads to the ﬁlling of two different urns with one ball
each. Proponents of a Multiverse correctly state that its existence would increase the
probability of life existing in some Universe,32 but this is only relevant to the
probability of life in this Universe if one identiﬁes any Universe with the same
properties as ours with our Universe.33 Such an identiﬁcation may be suggested by
the (weak) Anthropic Principle, but its is by no means implied by it, and one should
realize that the inference of a Multiverse from the FTA implicitly hinges on this
additional assumption.34
Moving from a probabilistic to an explanatory context, we follow Mellor (2002)
in claiming that if anything, a Multiverse would make ﬁne-tuning even more
puzzling. Taking the ﬁring squad analogy, there is no doubt that the survival of a
single executee is unexpected, but the question is whether it may be explained (or,
at least, whether it becomes less unexpected) by the assumption that simultane-
ously, many other ‘successful’ executions were taking place. From the probabilistic
point of view discussed above, their presence should have no bearing on the case of
the lone survivor, whose luck remains as amazing as it was. From another,
explanatory point of view, it makes his survival even more puzzling, since we now
know from this additional information about the other executions that apparently
the marksmen usually do kill their victims.
32Bradley (2012, p. 164) states verbatim that he is computing the probability that “At least one
universe has the right constants for life”, other authors doing likewise either explicitly or tacitly.
33Bradley (2009) counters objections like Hacking’s by the claim that “if there are many
Universes, there is a greater chance that Alpha [i.e., our Universe] will exist”. This implies the
same identiﬁcation.
34We side with Hartle and Srednicki (2007) in believing that the identiﬁcation in question is
solidly wrong: “This notion presupposes that we exist separately from our physical description.
But we are not separate from our physical description in our data; we are the physical system
described (…) It is our data that is used in a Bayesian analysis to discriminate between theories.
What other hypothetical observers with data different from ours might see, how many of them
there are, and what properties they might or might not share with us (…) are irrelevant for this
process.”.
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6 Conclusion
Already the uncontroversial examples that feed the FTA sufﬁce to produce the
fascinating insight that the formal structure of our current theories of (sub)nuclear
physics and cosmology (i.e., the Standard Model of particle physics and Einstein’s
theory of General Relativity) is insufﬁcient to predict the rich phenomenology these
theories give rise to: the precise values of most (if not all) constants and initial
conditions play an equally decisive role. This is a recent insight: even a physicist
having the stature of Nobel Laureate Glashow (1999, p. 80) got this wrong, having
initially paraphrased the situation well:
“Imagine a television set with lots of knobs: for focus, brightness, tint, contrast, bass, treble,
and so on. The show seems much the same whatever the adjustments, within a large range.
The standard model is a lot like that.
Who would care if the tau lepton mass were doubled or the Cabibbo angle halved? The
standard model has about 19 knobs. They are not really adjustable: they have been adjusted
at the factory. Why they have their values are 19 of the most baffling metaquestions
associated with particle physics.”
In our view, the insight that the standard model is not like that at all is the real
upshot of the FTA.35 Attempts to draw further conclusions from it in the direction
of either Design or a Multiverse are, in our opinion, unwarranted. For one thing, as
we argued, at best they fail to have any explanatory or probabilistic thrust (unless
they rely on precarious additional assumptions), and at worst ﬁne-tuning actually
seems to turn against them.
Most who agree with this verdict would probably feel left with a choice between
the options of Blind Chance and Blind Necessity; the present state of science does
not allow us to make such a choice now (at least not rationally), and the question
even arises if science will ever be able to make it (in a broader context), except
perhaps philosophically (e.g., à la Kant). However, we would like to make a brief
case for the ﬁfth position, stating that the ﬁne-tuning problem is misguided and that
all we need to do is to clear away confusion.
There are analogies and differences between cosmic ﬁne-tuning for life through
the laws of Nature and the initial conditions of the Universe, as discussed so far, and
Evolution in the sense of Darwin and Wallace. The latter is based on random
(genetic) variation, survival of the ﬁttest, and heritability of ﬁtness. All these are
meant to apply locally, i.e., to life on Earth. We personally feel that arguments to
extend these principles to the Universe in the sense that the Cosmos may undergo
some kind of ‘biological’ evolution, having descendants born in singularities, per-
haps governed by different laws and initial conditions (some of which, then, might
be ‘ﬁne-tuned for life’, as in the Multiverse argument), as argued by e.g., Wheeler
(in Ch. 44 of Misner et al. 1973) and Smolin (1997), imaginative as they may be, are
too speculative to merit serious discussion. Instead, the true analogy seems to be as
35Callender (2004) understandably misquotes Glashow, writing: “The standard model is not like
that.”.
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follows: as far as the emergence and subsequent evolution of life are concerned, the
Universe and our planet Earth should simply be taken as given. Thus the funda-
mental reason we feel ‘ﬁne-tuning for life’ requires no explanation is this36:
Our Universe has not been ﬁne-tuned for life: life has been ﬁne-tuned to our
Universe.
Acknowledgement The author is indebted to Jeremy Butterﬁeld, Craig Callender, Jelle Goeman,
Olivier Hekster, Casey McCoy, Herman Philipse, Jos Ufﬁnk, and Ellen van Wolde for comments,
discussions, and encouragement, all of which considerably improved this paper.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial 2.5 License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/) which
permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original author(s) and source are credited. The images or other third party material in this chapter
are included in the work’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line;
if such material is not included in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action
is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license
holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.
References
Aguirre, A. (2001). The Cold Big-Bang cosmology as a counter-example to several anthropic
arguments. Physical Review D, 64, 083508.
Aquinas, T. (1485). Summa theologica (written 1268–1274). Basel: M. Wenssler. Written.
Arnett, D. (1996). Supernovae and nucleosynthesis: An investigation of the history of matter, from
the Big Bang to the present. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Barnes, L. A. (2012). The ﬁne-tuning of the universe for intelligent life. Publications of the
Astronomical Society of Australia, 29, 529–556.
Barrow, J. D., & Tipler, F. (1986). The anthropic cosmological principle. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Bentley, R. (1692). A confutation of atheism from the origin and frame of the world. London:
Mortlock.
Bostrom, N. (2002). Anthropic bias: Observation selection effects in science and philosophy. New
York: Routledge.
Bradford, R. (2011). The inevitability of ﬁne tuning in a complex universe. International Journal
of Theoretical Physics, 50, 1577–1601.
Bradford, R. (2013). Rick’s critique of cosmic coincidences. Retrieved on April 6, 2015 www.
rickbradford.co.uk/Coincidences.html.
Bradley, D. (2009). Multiple universes and the observation selection effects. American
Philosophical Quarterly, 46, 61–72.
Bradley, D. (2012). Four problems about self-locating belief. Philosophical Review, 121, 149–177.
36From this point of view, what we see as the essential mistake made by those who feel ﬁne-tuning
does require an explanation is similar to what Butterﬁeld (1931) famously christened ‘Whig
History’, i.e., “the tendency in many historians to write on the side of Protestants and Whigs, to
praise revolutions provided they have been successful, to emphasize certain principles of progress
in the past and to produce a story which is the ratiﬁcation if not the gloriﬁcation of the present.”
(quoted from the Preface).
126 K. Landsman
Bradley, M. C. (2001). The ﬁne-tuning argument. Religious Studies, 37, 451–466.
Bradley, M. C. (2002). The ﬁne-tuning argument: The Bayesian version. Religious Studies, 38,
375–404.
Butterﬁeld, H. (1931). The Whig interpretation of history. London: Bell.
Callender, C. (2004). Measures, explanations and the past: Should ‘special’ initial conditions be
explained? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55, 195–217.
Callender, C. (2010). The Past Hypothesis meets gravity. In G. Ernst & A. Hütteman (Eds.), Time,
chance, and reduction: Philosophical aspects of statistical mechanics (pp. 34–58). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Carroll, S. M., & Tam, H. (2010). Unitary evolution and cosmological ﬁne-tuning. arXiv:1007.
1417.
Collins, R. (2009). The teleological argument: An exploration of the ﬁne-tuning of the universe.
In W. L. Craig & J. P. Moreland (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to natural theology
(pp. 202–281). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Colyvan, M., Garﬁeld, J. L., & Priest, G. (2005). Problems with the argument from ﬁne tuning.
Synthese, 145, 325–338.
Davies, P. (2006). The Goldilocks dilemma: Why is the universe just right for life? New York:
Mariner.
Dawkins, R. (1986). The blind watchmaker. New York: Norton.
Dawkins, R. (1996). Climbing mount improbable. New York: Norton.
de Spinoza, B. (1677). Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. Amsterdam: J. Rieuwertsz.
De Waal, F. (2013). The Bonobo and the atheist. New York: Norton.
Earman, J. (1987). The SAP also rises: A critical examination of the anthropic principle. American
Philosophical Quarterly, 24, 307–317.
Earman, J. (2006). The “Past Hypothesis”: Not even false. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics, 37, 399–430.
Eckhardt, W. (2006). Causal time asymmetry. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics, 37, 439–466.
Ekström, S., et al. (2010). Effects of the variation of fundamental constants on Population iii stellar
evolution. Astronomy & Astrophysics, 514, A62.
Ellis, G. G. R. (2007). Issues in the philosophy of cosmology. In J. Butterﬁeld & J. Earman (Eds.),
Philosophy of physics Part B (pp. 1183–1286). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Everitt, N. (2004). The non-existence of God. London: Routlegde.
Fernandez, R., Fröhlich, J., & Sokal, A. D. (1992). Random walks, critical phenomena, and
triviality in quantum ﬁeld theory. Heidelberg: Springer.
Glimm, J., & Jaffe, A. (1987). Quantum physics: A functional integral point of view. New York:
Springer.
Galli, D., & Palla, F. (2013). The dawn of chemistry. Annual Review of Astronomy and
Astrophysics, 51, 163–206.
Glashow, S. L. (1999). Does quantum ﬁeld theory need a foundation? In T. Y. Cao (Ed.),
Conceptual foundations of quantum ﬁeld theory (pp. 74–88). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Grinbaum, A. (2012). Which ﬁne-tuning problems are ﬁne? Foundations of Physics, 42, 615–631.
Hacking, I. (1987). The inverse gambler’s fallacy: The argument from design. The anthropic
principle applied to Wheeler universes. Mind, 96, 331–340.
Halvorson, H. (2014). A probability problem in the ﬁne-tuning argument. http://philsci-archive.
pitt.edu/11004/.
Hartle, J. B., & Srednicki, M. (2007). Are we typical? Physical Review D, 75, 123523.
Handﬁeld, T. (2012). A philosophical guide to chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hogan, C. J. (2000). Why the universe is just so. Reviews of Modern Physics, 72, 1149–1161.
Holt, J. (2012).Why does the world exist? An existential detective story. New York: W.W. Norton.
Howson, C., & Urbach, P. (2006). Scientiﬁc reasoning: The Bayesian approach (3rd ed.).
Chicago: Open Court.
Jorink, E. (2010). Reading the book of nature in the Dutch Golden Age (1575–1715). Leiden: Brill.
The Fine-Tuning Argument … 127
Kenny, A. (1969). The ﬁve ways: St Thomas Aquinas’ proofs of God’s existence. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Koperski, J. (2005). Should we care about ﬁne-tuning? The British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, 56, 303–319.
Küng, H. (2005). Der Anfang aller Dinge: Naturwissenschaft und Religion. München: Piper.
Lebowitz, J. L. (2008). From time-symmetric microscopic dynamics to time-asymmetric
macroscopic behavior: An overview. In G. Gallavotti, W. L. Reiter & J. Yngavson (Eds.),
Boltzmann’s Legacy (pp. 38–62). Zürich: European Mathematical Society.
Leslie, J. (1988). No inverse Gambler’s fallacy in cosmology. Mind, 97, 269–272.
Leslie, J. (1989). Universes. London: Routledge.
Leslie, J., & Kunh, R. L. (2013). The mystery of existence: Why is there anything at all?
Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Liddle, A. R., & Lyth, D. A. (2000). Cosmological inflation and large-scale structure. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Manson, N. A. (2000). There is no adequate deﬁnition of ‘ﬁne-tuned for life’. Inquiry, 43, 341–352.
Manson, N. A. (Ed.). (2003). God and design. London: Routledge.
Manson, N. A. (2009). The ﬁne-tuning argument. Philosophy Compass, 4, 271–286.
Manson, N. A., & Thrush, M. J. (2003). Fine-tuning, multiple universes, and the “this universe”
objection. Paciﬁc Philosophical Quarterly, 84, 67–83.
Martin, J. (2012). Everything you always wanted to know about the cosmological constant
problem (but were afraid to ask). Comptes Rendus Physique, 13, 566–665.
McCoy, C. (2015). What is the horizon problem? Preprint.
McGrew, T., McGrew, L., & Vestrup, E. (2001). Probabilities and the ﬁne-tuning argument: A
sceptical view. Mind, 110, 1027–1038.
Mellor, D. H. (2002). Too many universes. In N. A. Manson (Ed.), God and design: The
teleological argument and modern science (pp. 221–228). London: Routledge.
Misner, C., Thorne, K., & Wheeler, J. A. (1973). Gravitation. San Francisco: Freeman.
Monod, J. (1971). Chance and necessity: An essay on the natural philosophy of modern biology.
New York: A. Knopf.
Noordmans, O. (1934). Herschepping. Zeist: De Nederlandsche Christen-Studenten-Vereeniging.
Norton, J. D. (2010). Cosmic confusions: Not supporting versus supporting not. Philosophy of
Science, 77, 501–523.
Paley, W. (1802). Natural theology: Or evidences of the existence and attributes of the deity
collected from the appearances of nature. London: J. Foulder.
Penrose, R. (1979). Singularities and time-asymmetry. In S. W. Hawking & W. Israel (Eds.),
General relativity: An Einstein centenary survey (pp. 581–638). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Penrose, R. (2004). The road to reality: A complete guide to the laws of the universe. London:
Jonathan Cape.
Philipse, H. (2012). God in the age of science? A Critique of religious reason. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Planck Collaboration (2014). Planck intermediate results. XXIV. Constraints on variation of
fundamental constants. Astronomy & Astrophysics. arXiv:1406.7482.
Planck Collaboration (2015). Planck 2015 results. XIII. Cosmological parameters. arXiv:1502.
01589.
Price, H. (1997). Time’s arrow & Archimedes’ point. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rees, M. (1999). Just six numbers. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Rundle, B. (2004). Why there is something rather than nothing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schellekens, A. N. (2013). Life at the interface of particle physics and string theory. Reviews of
Modern Physics, 85, 1491–1540.
Schiffrin, J. S., & Wald, R. M. (2012). Measure and probability in cosmology. Physical Review D,
86, 023521.
Schilpp, P. A. (1949). Albert Einstein: Philosopher-scientist (Vol. 1). La Salle: Open Court.
128 K. Landsman
Smeenk, C. (2014). Predictability crisis in early universe cosmology. Studies in History and
Philosophy of Modern Physics, 46, 122–133.
Smith, J. M., & Szathmáry, E. (1995). The major transitions in evolution. Oxford: Freeman.
Smith, Q., & Craig, W. L. (1993). Theism, atheism and Big Bang cosmology (pp. 203–204).
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Smolin, L. (1997). The life of the cosmos. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sober, E. (2004). The design argument. In W. E. Mann (Ed.), Blackwell guide to the philosophy of
religion (pp. 117–147). Oxford: Blackwell.
Sober, G. (2008). Evidence and evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stenger, V. (2011). The fallacy of ﬁne-tuning: Why the universe is not designed for us. Amherst
(NY): Prometheus.
Susskind, L. (2005). The Cosmic landscape: String theory and the illusion of intelligent design.
New York: Little, Brown.
Swinburne, R. (2004). The existence of God (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tegmark, M., Aguirre, A., Rees, M. J., & Wilczek, F. (2006). Dimensionless constants,
cosmology, and other dark matters. Physical Review D, 73, 023505.
Ufﬁnk, J. (2007). Compendium of the foundations of classical statistical physics. In J. Butterﬁeld
& J. Earman (Eds.), Philosophy of physics part B (pp. 923–1074). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Van Wolde, E. (2009). Why the verb bāra’ does not mean ‘to create’ in Genesis 1.1–2.4a. Journal
for the Study of the Old Testament, 34, 3–23.
Wallace, D. (2010). Gravity, entropy, and cosmology: In search of clarity. The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 61, 513–540.
Wallace, D. (2012). The emergent multiverse: Quantum theory according to the Everett
interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ward, P., & Brownlee, D. (2000). Rare earth. New York: Copernicus Books.
Weinberg, S. (1977). The ﬁrst three minutes. New York: Basic Books.
Weinberg, S. (2007). Living in the multiverse. In B. Carr (Ed.), Universe or multiverse
(pp. 29–42). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weinberg, S. (2008). Cosmology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
White, R. (2000). Fine-tuning and multiple universes. Noûs, 34, 260–276.
The Fine-Tuning Argument … 129
